ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The insurgence of threats most especially new threats on the internet calls for serious concern. These threats target assets both in the inside and the demilitarize zone (DMZ) of the networks. In fact, availability of reputable security set up at the demilitarize zone will improve security at the inside zone. While the assets in the inside zone are protected by inside firewall, application firewall inclusive, the asset in the DMZ could benefit from outside zone firewall. This is in line with Intrusion Prevention System goal [2] of detecting intrusions and responding to the intrusions actively using firewall. A simple representation of the analogy is presented in Figure  1 .
Defining what constitutes an attack is difficult because multiple perspectives are involved. Attacks may involve any number of attackers and victims. The attacker's viewpoint is typically characterized by intent and risk of exposure. From a victim's perspective, intrusions are characterized by their manifestations, which may or may not include damage. Some attacks may produce no manifestations, and some apparent manifestations may result from system and network malfunctions. Some attacks involve the involuntary participation of additional machines, usually victims of earlier attacks. For an intrusion to occur, it requires both an overt act by an attacker and a manifestation, observable by the intended victim, which results from that act [10] .
A victim's view of an attack is usually focused on these manifestations:
• Therefore, in order to successfully militate against attacks in the network most especially in situation of intrusion prediction, a reliable incidence response mechanism for defence against attacks from attackers and victim point of view is required. This will culminate in extensive analysis of events, accurate prediction and real time prevention of eventualities. That is, real time proactive response can be issued as there will not be need to carry out any analysis of event at the response segment. We present techniques to automatically rate threats from intrusion alerts generated by Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
RELATED WORKS
Several works have been carried out on threat modelling in computer networks. These works will be reviewed under network attack strategy analysis and risk assessment.
Many of the works on attack strategy analysis concentrated on attack graph modelling. According to [14] , a network attack graph is a state transition diagram in which each state represents a state of the attacker, the defender and the system. Transitions in an attack graph represent actions taken by an attacker which results in a change in the state of the entire system [9] . An action from the attacker may lead to the state which is the attacker's goal. If the system is in a final state, it means that the attacker has succeeded in exploiting the system. An action from a defender team can void the actions of the attacker and can lead to previous safer states. [9] suggested a data mining based approach to generate attack graphs. The purpose of their work is to use data mining to construct attack graphs. There is a casual relationship between an attacker and the alert raised by IDS. They performed data mining on intrusion alerts to find association rules from the dataset.
In [3] , pre and post-conditions were defined for individual attacks, and alerts were connected (or correlated) when the post-condition of one alert matches the precondition of a later one. This allowed for the specification of complex chains of attacks without having to explicitly model complex scenarios. For an example of an attack that can be correlated using this technique, they considered an attack where the intruder first breaks into a host in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) of a company. A demilitarized zone is a computer network that sits between the internal network and the Internet and acts as a security bufferer. After breaking into this host, the attacker performs another attack starting from the compromised host. Both steps of the attack were captured by attack graph. [1] suggested that one method for handling attack graph complexity and scalability is to differentiate between likely and unlikely attack paths using threat modelling. Their approach used a decision model to identify the most probable attack path using threat modelling.
In risk assessment researches in network systems, [12] posited that security risk assessment and mitigation are two vital processes that need to be executed to maintain a productive information technology infrastructure. They resolved that other risk assessment models have not helped to reason about the causal dependencies between network states. Further, the optimization formulations ignore the issue of resource availability while analyzing a risk model. Hence, their paper proposed a risk management framework using Bayesian networks that enable a system administrator to quantify the chances of network compromise at various levels. Also, [5] proposed fuzzy system approach to rank vulnerability based on the possible risk of network assets. However, quantifying network assets in terms of possible risk is not trivial. Therefore, their work was impractical. Another work with the same demerit on fuzzy risk assessment in distributed system was carried out by [6] .
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This following presents some of the techniques used in this work for network threat characterization.
Data Mining
Data Mining refers to the nontrivial extraction of implicit, previously unknown and potentially useful information from data in databases [15] . It is a key step of Knowledge Discovery from Databases (KDD). In other words, Data Mining involves the systematic analysis of large data sets using automated methods which are mostly statistical, machine learning and soft computing based. By probing data in this manner, it is possible to prove or disprove existing hypotheses or ideas regarding data or information, while discovering new or previously unknown information. It is noted for its Pattern Recognition ability that ensures that information is obtained from vague data. The data mining procedure used for our work involves the following steps: 
Frequent Sequence Temporal Patterns
Once the alerts are recorded in the database, the next step is to process the alert information and prepare it for the next step of the processing. The alerts have signature id and timestamp information with it. Each Signature ID could be an integer number or letters and indicates a different type of an attack. The whole intrusion alerts are sorted in ascending order by their timestamp in sequence. This is called global attack sequence.
The "Attack Sequence Time Window" [9] is the time interval which is moved along the global attack sequence. Attack Sequence Time Window is presented in Figure 2 . In this step, the global sequence of attacks is broken down into smaller attack. 
Apriori Algorithm
The algorithm is used to find the frequent itemsets that is the sets of sequence that have minimum support. The minimum support is used to generate association rules. The pseudocode is presented as follows: 
Fuzzy Control System
Fuzzy control replaces the role of the mathematical model in cases of imprecision. It depends on rule set obtainable from experts in the domain of discourse. The process of inference is used to bind inputs together to produce the desired outputs.
The general inference process proceeds in four steps:
a. Fuzzification, the membership functions defined on the input variables are applied to their actual values, to determine the degree of truth for each rule premise. b. Inference, the truth value for the premise of each rule is computed, and applied to the conclusion part of each rule. This results in one fuzzy subset to be assigned to each output variable for each rule. We use Min as inference rules. where N is the number of output members.
Decision Hierarchy of Criteria and Sub-Criteria of Threat
Attackers perpetrate attacks based on the characteristics of the victim and their objectives. Attackers can be generally divided into Experienced and Novice and/or Opportunist, Hackers, Explorer. To cater for these two widely acceptable taxonomies of attackers [9] [4], we modify [1] Decision Hierarchy of Criteria and Sub-Criteria to include Accessibility criterion with Authentication, and Access Vector sub-criteria in conformity with [11] as presented in Figure  3 .
The value high, medium and low is the category of individual threat. In Table 1 , we present the Criteria Rating for Threat. An expert adversary always engages in exploits with high intention of success coupled with high consideration for risk of detection. This affects its complexity, therefore accessibility is high. An adversary who falls below the expert category can be an associate or a beginner. If it is an associate, its concern for success and potential damage are high. Its choices of exploit are often sound in theory but poor in practice. A beginner adversary uses trial and error method; therefore, it perpetrates different exploits in order to reach its goal. In fact, it may not even be aware of the goal when it is reached 
Association Mining Model
The frequent temporal sequence association miner was set at 0.5 confidence level. Table 2,  Table 3 , Table 4 and 
Fuzzy Threat Rating
Risk is a function of threat likelihood and potential damage on an asset. However, it is intuitively impossible to get the precise value of these variables. Hence, obtaining the value of risk in precise term is not trivial [5] . Hence, we adopted fuzzy system in modelling threat. In Table 6 , a rules matrix consisting of fuzzy rules is presented.
Threat confidence weight is the confidence value of the exploit as generated by the frequent association miner. The linguistic variable set is given as:
Input A = {Very High, Moderately High, Somewhat High}
The target input variable set is made up of base scores obtained from National Vulnerability Database CVS (NVD, 2012) whose linguistic variables set is given as From the frequent association rules presented in Table 2, Table 3 , Table 4 and Table 5 , same exploit sequences have different confidence value at different scenarios and zones. This does not reflect the true nature of threats because same threats are expected to have the same characteristics. We attribute this to victim attributes which include among others [12] : i. system vulnerabilities (as reported in vulnerability databases such as BugTraq, CERT/CC, or netcat), ii.
(insecure) system properties such as unsafe security policy, corrupted file/memory access permission, or read-write access in file structure, iii.
(insecure) network properties such as unsafe network condition, unsafe firewall properties, unsafe device/ peripheral access permission, and iv.
access privilege such as user account, guest account, or root account.
However, in our experimental study on fuzzy model, we found for each group the threat rating, given that the vulnerability base score of the threat is 10 as presented in CVSS [11] [8]. This is practical considering the vulnerability of the systems as reported in DARPA 2000 Scenario Dataset [7] which is typical of an experimental settings used to obtain publicly available intrusion dataset and the fact that there is no system without vulnerability [13] . The threat ratings are the output of the defuzzification step. These threat ratings for the exploits association rules are presented in Table 7, Table 8 , Table 9 and Table 10 .
The results of the experiments presented in Table 7, Table 8 , Table 9 and Table 10 show that at vulnerability base score of 10 with varied confidence value of sequence of exploits, the outcome of fuzzy threat rating for same exploits are equal for all scenarios both inside and outside the network. In fact, at both the inside and the demilitarize zone, the threat rating for same sequence of exploit are the same. This shows that system are not only susceptible to threat in the inside but also at the demilitarize zone. The threat ratings also show that the threat characteristics lie within low and medium range of the threat rating membership category. However, exploits with the threat rating of 0.375 lie between low and medium category of threat unlike exploits with 0.25 and 0.5 which are either low or medium. With reference to criteria rating in Table 1 , beginner adversary (or Scenario 1 Attacker) for DARPA 2000 Scenario threats are rated as either low or medium while associate adversary (or Scenario 2 Attacker) for same experiment are also rated either as low or medium. This shows that beginner adversary could perpetrate both medium and low level threat and associate adversary could perpetrate both medium and low level threats. However, the stealth nature of their exploits is determined by the properties of the victims, characteristics and the objectives as shown in the exploit confidence value of the association rule.
CONCLUSION
This work clearly demonstrates that threat could be rated from the perspective of attack exploits using Association Rules and Fuzzy Logic regardless of the imprecise knowledge of risk. Also, this paper proved the assertion that threat should be monitored in the inside and demilitarized zone of the network for reliable security. The paper considers attacks and attackers from a perspective different from previous works on intrusion prediction and prevention. It emphasizes that attacker's change their exploits based on victim properties, their capabilities and objectives instead of either victim centric or attacker centric attack model. Moreover, the result conforms to what is reported about DARPA 2000 Scenario Dataset [7] .
Nonetheless, this work focused on threats targeted at a single host with different characteristics of adversary. In future, we shall consider multiple hosts and use the result to predict intrusion.
